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Abstract
Branching theories are popular frameworks for modeling objec-
tive indeterminism in the form of a future of open possibilities.
In such theories, the notion of a history plays a crucial role: it is
both a basic ingredient in the axiomatic definition of the frame-
work, and it is used as a parameter of truth in semantics for
languages with a future tense. Furthermore, histories—complete
possible courses of events—ground the notion of modal consis-
tency: a set of events is modally consistent iff there is a history
containing that set.
We will explain these roles of histories and highlight some critical
aspects having to do with the fact that histories are global and, in
a relevant sense, “big” objects. The notion of modal consistency,
on the other hand, has both local and global aspects. We ask
in how far a local notion of modal consistency can serve as an
alternative to the common uses of histories, and work out two
recent approaches to alternatives to histories. Combining these
approaches, we develop a novel semantics for branching time.
1 Introduction
The idea of an open future is deeply ingrained in many of our everyday
concepts and practices. Hope, regret and arguably even the notion of an
action presuppose the openness of the future, and betting and deciding make
no real sense without open future possibilities. Even concepts having no
practical import, such as many concepts of natural kinds, rely on the notion
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of future possibilities, since kinds of things are usually characterized via
dispositions and potentialities.
Saying this may already be contentious, given a philosophical environ-
ment in which Lewis’s project of Humean supervenience is held in high es-
teem. It will be even more contentious to say the next thing: that the possi-
bilities involved have to be interpreted objectively—as possibilities grounded
in the way our world is like, independently of us—, and not as mere epistemic
possibilities—grounded in the way we picture the world, be it in everyday
talk or via scientific theories.
For present purposes it will be enough to acknowledge that the notion
of an open future makes initial sense, and that it has its uses, whatever its
ultimate metaphysical standing. It certainly is in need of elucidation.
Arguably, the best way to tackle the notion of an open future is via the-
ories of branching histories—theories that take the everyday notion of “one
present moment, many possibilities in the future” at face value and accord-
ingly picture the world as a branching tree of possible courses of events, or via
similar, technically more involved models. The hope is that formal branch-
ing theories can be both “proto-humanistic” and “proto-scientific” (Belnap,
2007), thereby doing justice to the two “images of man” that Sellars (1963)
introduced: the “manifest” image of everyday life and the “scientific” image
that we create through our scientific practices.
Again, there is a big debate about the virtues of theories of branching
histories, with respect to which we wish to remain officially neutral—in order
to motivate our enterprise, it will be enough to grant that such theories make
initial sense as attempts to spell out the notion of an open future, and to
acknowledge that there are well developed, mathematically precise formal
frameworks for branching histories.
There are two main strands of branching theories that have been dis-
cussed in metaphysics, semantics and philosophy of science to at least some
extent: the Prior/Thomason theory of branching time (Prior, 1967; Thoma-
son, 1970), and Belnap’s theory of branching space-times (Belnap, 1992). In
both these theories, a crucial role is played by the notion of an (alterna-
tive) history : given a mathematical structure representing our world (with
its thisworldly, but incompatible open futures of possibility), histories are
singled out as maximally consistent substructures, in some modal sense of
consistency.1 Histories play at least two important roles in branching the-
1By “modal consistency” of a set of events, or “modal compatibilty” of two events, we
mean to refer to an intuitive notion that is in need of explication. Roughly, a set of events
is modally consistent iff all the events can occur together, none of them excluding the
occurrence of any of the others. Note that we are not referring to a syntactical notion of
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ories: (1) They are often used in the formulation of the axiomatic basis of
a branching theory itself, e.g., in Belnap’s prior choice principle (see §2.2
below); (2) they play a crucial role in the semantics for the future tense that
can be defined on the basis of such theories.
The present paper is concerned with developing some alternatives to the
use of histories. This enterprise is motivated by the fact that even though
histories are not possible worlds, they are still large structures with a global
ring to them: given a branching structure, its histories normally extend as
far, both spatially and temporally, as the structure itself. The technical
employment of histories, however, often only uses local aspects of histories—
in some non-technical sense of locality to be clarified—, and epistemic access
to whole histories of our world is impossible. The paper thus continues a
search for appropriate small structures for BST that was begun in papers by
Placek (2010) and Müller (2010).
We start by introducing the two mentioned relevant formal branching
theories, branching time and branching space-times, and their respective
history definitions, in §2. The worries alluded to above will be spelled out
in §3, where we look in more detail at the notion of modal consistency that
stands behind the definition of a history in the two frameworks. We will
try to explicate philosophical assumptions about modal consistency with a
view to possible generalizations. Such generalizations are the topic of §4.
We will work out two recent approaches: consistency in terms of possible
continuations, as proposed by Placek (2010), and consistency in terms of
sets of indeterministic transitions. Both approaches in our view provide
promising local alternatives to the usual employment of histories, and their
combination leads to a novel semantics for branching time.
2 Histories in branching theories
We start by discussing the case of branching time (§2.1) before considering
the more complex case of branching space-times (§2.2). We will develop
branching time in a way that makes the extension to branching space-times
go smoothly.
2.1 Histories in branching time
The notion of an open future of possibilities brings together a temporal
notion—the future—with a modal one—possibility. Interaction between time
consistency here.
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and modality is a common fact of everyday life; witness “no use crying over
spilt milk”: before the spilling, we assume it was possible to prevent it, but
now it isn’t any more, and we have to move on. Living, we think, means
making use of some possibilities and letting others go by; and they don’t
come back.
This picture—for what it’s worth—is well captured by the idea of the
world (our world, the world we live in) as a branching tree of possibilities,
such as the one pictured in Figure 1.
4 o'clock
rainno rain
a b
Figure 1: A branching tree of possibilities: rain or no rain at 4 o’clock.
This image is explored in many works of fiction, such as the 1993 French
movies Smoking/No Smoking, but it has also been worked out in terms of a
logical theory called branching time (BT). Prior (1967, 122–127), following
a suggestion by Kripke dating from 1958, gives a brief description of the
main ideas; Thomason (1970) has the first fully worked-out system, which
he uses in the context of supervaluationist semantics—an idea that is however
independent of BT itself.
Technically, one defines the class of branching trees—BT-structures—as
follows:
Definition 1 (BT-structure) A BT-structure is a non-empty partial or-
der of moments 〈M,≤〉 (i.e., a nonempty set M with a transitive and anti-
symmetric relation ≤) such that
(1) there is no backward branching, i.e., for all m,m′,m′′ ∈ M for which
m′ < m and m′′ < m, we have either m′ ≤ m′′ or m′′ ≤ m′;
(2) any elements m and m′ have a greatest common lower bound in M ;
(3) M has no maximal elements, i.e., for any m ∈M , there is some m′ ∈M
s.t. m < m′.
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The strict < order corresponding to ≤, used in clause (1), is defined, as
usual, via
m < m′ ⇔df (m ≤ m′ & m 6= m′).
Of the three mentioned conditions, (1) is standard, (2) and (3) are optional,
but are included here for reasons of continuity with the case of branching
space-times that is the subject of §2.2.
A further condition (4), which is especially useful if one wants to identify
clock times across incompatible alternatives (e.g., rain or no rain at 4 o’clock,
as in Figure 1), already relies on the notion of a history, as does the use of
BT-structures (also called BT-frames) in semantics.2 Histories are taken
to be complete possible courses of events: a history has to be (a) modally
consistent in the sense of being possible as a whole (no event in a history
excluding the occurrence of any other), and (b) maximally so. In BT the
definition is as follows:
Definition 2 (History in BT) Given a BT-structure 〈M,≤〉, a set h ⊆
M is a history iff h is a maximal linear subset, or a maximal chain, in M ,
i.e., a subset h that is linearly ordered (for any m,m′ ∈ h, either m′ ≤ m or
m < m′) and such that no proper superset h′ ) h has that feature.
Thus, modal consistency (a) is spelled out in terms of order-relatedness: a
subset of M is modally consistent iff it is a chain, i.e., if any two of its
members are order-related. This makes intuitive sense: in a branching tree
of open future possibilities, you cannot consistently mix two incompatible
futures after they have branched, so that consistency requires linearity. For
example, events a and b in Figure 1 are not order related, so there is no
history containing them both. If there is only one history (which would be
the case in a deterministic world), all of M is linearly ordered.
Maximality (b) is spelled out in the usual set-theoretic sense: histories
are modally consistent and such that no proper superset is consistent. If you
add even a single moment to a history, you will have added in a moment
that is not order-related to all the others; the extended set then contains an
incomparable and thus, inconsistent pair of moments.
In terms of histories, condition (2) of Definition 1 above says that all
histories have a non-empty intersection, and that that intersection contains
a greatest element. By (1), histories are downward closed, i.e., if m ∈ h and
m′ ≤ m, then m′ ∈ h.
2Condition (4) also moves BT structures closer to branching space-times, since order
isomorphism of histories to R enforces continuous structures.
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We can now also formulate the (optional) condition (4) mentioned above,
which allows us to define clock times via a partition of M :
Optional addendum to Definition 1
(4) All histories in M are order-isomorphic, i.e., if h, h′ are histories in
M , then there is a bijective mapping f : h→ h′ s.t. for all m,m′ ∈ h,
we have m ≤ m′ iff f(m) ≤ f(m′). Often it is useful to require that all
histories inM are order-isomorphic to the real numbers, R; this further
strengthens the parallel between BT and BST, as models of BST are
required to be continuous. We will assume, in addition, that there is
a function Time : M → R that gives a clock time Time(m) for each
moment m ∈M .
This condition makes essential use of the history definition, showing that
the notion of a history in BT can play an important role in the axiomatics.
The condition also highlights the motivation for calling elements m ∈ M
“moments” and not “times”: many different (in fact, modally incompatible)
moments can have the same clock time.
Above we also mentioned a second important use of histories: they func-
tion as parameters of truth in the semantics of the future tense. (Again,
contentious issues are lurking, this time connected with the idea of a so-
called Thin Red Line which makes possible an alternative semantics for the
future tense; part of the debate is whether such a semantics still captures
indeterminism. See Belnap et al. (2001, Ch. 6B, 8D), Øhrstrøm (2009) and
Øhrstrøm and Hasle (2011) for discussion.)
From now on we will be using not just BT-structures, but also models
built upon BT-structures: a BT-model M = 〈M,≤, v〉 is a BT-structure
〈M,≤〉 together with a valuation v that is invoked in the truth conditions
for atomic sentences.3 In case condition (4) is fulfilled, we will be dealing
with models M = 〈M,≤,Time, v〉, where Time is a clock-time function as
discussed above.
There is a problem about defining a future tense operator F based on
such models, intimately related to the time-honored problem of future con-
tingents (see, e.g., Øhrstrøm and Hasle, 2011). Speaking from within the
branching tree—at the moment of an utterance context, mC—there are usu-
ally many histories passing through that moment, many possible futures.
How do we decide whether a sentence referring to the future is true or not?
An objective understanding of the openness of the future demands that none
3We will not need to consider the details in what follows. For a careful exposition of
BT semantics, see Belnap et al. (2001).
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of the histories be singled out or marked as “the real future”, in contradis-
tinction to all the others: we have to be egalitarians with respect to future
possibilities if we want to retain objective indeterminism.4 This means that
a context of utterance cannot supply a “true future of the utterance”—all
possible futures have to be treated on a par. But how do we define truth
conditions then? One option, which Prior (1967, 128–134) called “Peircean”,
would be to quantify over all available histories universally. A sentence of
the form Fφ is then taken to be true at some m iff on all histories passing
through m (in all possible futures of m) there is a future moment at which
φ is true. This however leads to awkward results: truth thereby coincides
with settled truth; “it will be” is given the sense of “it is now unpreventable
that it will be”—which does not mesh well with common uses of the future
tense in common discourse.5
The innovative idea behind the so-called Ockhamist semantics for the
future tense in BT is to evaluate a sentence not just with respect to a model
M and a given moment m in a BT-structure, but also with respect to a
given history h through that moment. (It is customary to write such a
moment-history pair as “m/h”, indicating the presupposition that m ∈ h.)
The past (“P ”) and future tense (“F ”) are then taken to move evaluation
along that given history, backward (for the past) or forward (for the future),
in accordance with the following semantic rules that resemble the tense logic
for linear time:
• M,m/h |= Pφ iff there is some m′ ∈ h for which m′ < m and
M,m′/h |= φ;
• M,m/h |= Fφ iff there is some m′ ∈ h for which m < m′ and
M,m′/h |= φ.
While the history is superfluous in the clause for the past tense (given past
linearity of BT-structures; see clause (1) of Definition 1), the history is really
4For the record, this is where supporters of a Thin Red Line such as Øhrstrøm (2009)
would dissagree.
5Quantifying over histories existentially, which coincides with giving F the standard
semantics for a weak modal operator, fares even worse: it leads to the assessment that,
e.g., in Aristotle’s famous case of tomorrow’s sea battle, it both will be the case that
there is a sea battle and it will be the case that there is no sea battle tomorrow. This
is surely wrong. Lewis, in his famous but contested argument against branching (Lewis,
1986, 207f.), seems to be relying on just this flawed understanding of the future tense
(see also Belnap et al. (2001, Ch. 7B.2) for a discussion of Lewis). There are well-known
alternatives; see the main text.
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needed for definiteness of the clause for F .6
We will not embark on a more detailed discussion of Ockhamist semantics
here. (See, e.g., Belnap (2002a), Øhrstrøm (2009) and Øhrstrøm and Hasle
(2011) for a discussion of some controversial issues; MacFarlane (2011, Ch. 8)
gives a detailed overview.) The main point for this paper is that in Ockhamist
semantics (as well as in many of its rivals), histories are needed as parameters
of truth in the semantic clauses of the language.
We will leave it at that for now: we have shown that histories—maximal
modally consistent sets in a BT-structure, where consistency is spelled out
as linearity—play an important role for the theory of branching time. The
picture is similar, but also somewhat more intricate, in the case of branching
space-times (BST).
2.2 Histories in branching space-times
While branching time allows one to capture some important aspects of the
interaction between time and modality, it leaves out spatial relations among
events. Indeed, a “moment” in a BT-structure, if interpreted realistically, has
to be a “super-event” (Thomson, 1977) spanning all of space simultaneously.
This is an idea that does not mesh well with basic insights of relativity
theory, according to which there is no fact of the matter as to whether distant
(technically: space-like related) events are simultaneous or not. Furthermore,
it is hard, in BT, to spell out how two things happening at the same moment
can be either dependent (my coin’s landing heads, the coin making a sound
when landing) or independent (my coin’s landing heads, your coin’s landing
heads). More structure is needed; a plausible candidate for such additional
structure is the space-time of relativity theory.
The big question is how to keep incorporating time (now: space-time) and
modality in a single formal structure. A useful rewording of that question
is: What is a history in BST, i.e., a maximal modally consistent set? Again
this can be split up into two subquestions. We can safely assume that the
maximality of a history can again be spelled out in set-theoretic terms, as in
the case of BT. The difficult question that remains is: What does the notion
of modal consistency come to?
Again, a clue from the single history case may be helpful: if there is
just one history, the whole structure should be a single space-time. But how
6A history is also needed for the clause of the “seeing to it that” operator of the stit-
logic of agency that extends Ockhamist BT semantics; see Belnap et al. (2001) for an
overview.
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should that idea be captured formally? How can we characterize the unity
of a space-time?
Belnap’s crucial insight in working out BST (Belnap, 1992) was that
one could keep the basic structure of a partial ordering of (not moments,
but smaller, spatially local) possible point events in place and use a rather
intuitive notion of modal consistency motivated by a consideration of per-
spective: intuitively, events e1 and e2 are modally compatible (can co-occur
in one course of events) iff there is a perspective (given by a third event f)
from which one can say that both events have occurred. Formally, two events
e1 and e2 are modally compatible iff they have a common upper bound, i.e.,
iff there is some f for which e1 ≤ f and e2 ≤ f . Just like in branching time,
the fixedness of the past in contrast to the openness of the future is the key
to understanding modal consistency.
BST-structures are thus partial orderings 〈W,≤〉 (fulfilling certain addi-
tional conditions to be spelled out below), and modally consistent subsets A
of W are such that for any e1, e2 ∈ A there is f ∈ A for which e1 ≤ f and
e2 ≤ f . Such sets are called (upward) directed. In a directed set, for any two
of its members the set itself incorporates a perspective from which these two
members lie in the (causal) past.
Adding in the set-theoretic notion of maximality, the history definition
of BST is thus the following:
Definition 3 (History in BST) A history in a BST-structure 〈W,≤〉 is
a subset h ⊆ W that is upward directed and maximally so, i.e., no proper
superset of which is directed.
It remains to spell out what a BST-structure is. In that definition, histories
play an important role in a number of places. We follow Belnap in calling a
branching structure—in this case, a BST-structure—“our world”, or OW : it
incorporates non-trivial, thisworldly modality.
Definition 4 (BST-structure) A non-empty partial order OW = 〈W,≤〉
is a BST-structure iff
(1) OW has no maxima (i.e., for any e ∈ W there is some f ∈ W s.t.
e < f);
(2) each lower bounded chain (i.e., a linearly ordered subset C ⊆ W for
which there is some e ∈ W s.t. for any f ∈ C, e ≤ f) has an infimum
(a greatest lower bound) in W ;
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(3) for each upper bounded chain C ⊆ W and for each history h ⊆ W , if
C ⊆ h, then C has a supremum-in-h.
(4) (prior choice principle) if h1, h2 are histories and C is a lower bounded
chain in h1−h2 (i.e., a lower bounded chain wholly in h1 no element of
which lies in h2), then there is some e ∈ h1 ∩ h2 s.t. e < C (i.e., for all
f ∈ C, e < f) and such that e is maximal in h1 ∩ h2.
In this definition, the notion of a history plays an essential role in clauses
(3) and (4).7
This role of histories parallels the—less important—role that histories
play in the definition of (specific types of) BT-structures. The parallel also
holds for the second role of the history parameter in BT, viz., as a parameter
of truth in semantic clauses. While we will not spell out a semantics for a
language based on BST, it should be clear that the reasoning for the BT
case applies as well: a context of utterance can specify a number of relevant
parameters of truth—certainly the utterance event of the context, eC , itself,
and possibly also a rest frame grounding a notion of simultaneity—, but on
pain of denying the objectivity of an open future, it cannot single out as “the
real future” one of the histories through eC rather than some other.
So we see that the notion of a history, both in BT and in BST, plays at
least two important roles: as a building block for the definition of certain
relevant structures, and as a parameter for semantic theory. We will now
move on to a more detailed discussion of modal consistency, which will give
rise to some worries about the mentioned uses of histories.
3 Modal consistency
Above we have laid out how an intuitive notion of modal consistency is
spelled out in order-theoretic terms in the two branching theories considered
here, BT and BST. The respective history definitions lead to “big” histories
in the sense that they span a complete possible temporal development within
the branching tree of possibilities (in BT), or a whole space-time (in BST).
That is, histories are “big” relative to the branching order in which they are
defined. In what follows, we will assume that that branching order is meant
to cover all of our (indeterministic) world, and so we will be speaking of
histories as whole temporal courses of events from the big bang until after
the death of the sun (in BT), or as whole space-times (in BST). Of course, a
history cannot be bigger than the branching order in which it is defined—the
7The axiomatic system of BST is therefore second order.
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important point is that it is global with respect to that ordering. There is
however also a more “local”, generalized notion of modal consistency. We
will motivate that notion here with a view towards technical considerations
that will be the subject of §4.
3.1 Ways of specifying modal consistency
It will be good to first discuss some assumptions about the notion of modal
consistency that we are working with. For this we will not presuppose that
we are working with a theory based on partial orders (such as BT and BST),
but admit also more general resources. There appear to be three ways to
spell out modal consistency.
(1) First, modal consistency can be specified explicitly. When we map
out possibilities in the form of stories, for example, we will normally describe
the individual options directly, thereby (implictly) proclaiming them to be
individually modally consistent. If I deliberate where to go next weekend,
for example, I will map out individual options separately (to a very limited
degree of detail of course), and there is no need for me to “carve up” any
given larger structure containing all these possibilities into individual, con-
sistent scenarios. Technically, option (1) amounts to treating histories as
basic entities.
(2) Second, it can be helpful to tackle the notion of modal consistency via
its negation, modal inconsistency. The idea here is that if we have a full list
of possible sources of modal inconsistency, we thereby have a guarantee that
any scenario we specify that avoids the pitfalls, is thereby already modally
consistent. One clear source of modal inconsistency is running together dif-
ferent “local” alternatives—in a sense to be specified. For example, it cannot
be that the same thing has incompatible properties, like being red all over
and being green all over, at the same time. Any scenario that describes
things in such an inconsistent way is thereby itself inconsistent. A similar
principle works against combinations of things that by their nature cannot
be in one scenario together; not all things can coexist. It seems difficult,
however, to spell this out in a perspicuous formal way in full generality.
For a formally clear principle in the vicinity of these considerations, con-
sider the following: if there are alternatives to a certain happening (such as
my walking to the market today, when I could have stayed at home, or taken
the bike), then a consistent scenario cannot contain more than one of them.
If it runs together different concrete alternatives, we may call a scenario bla-
tantly inconsistent, a clear sign of modal inconsistency. Furthermore, while
a scenario may not be blatantly inconsistent the way it is described, we may
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know that filling in gaps in the description will lead to blatant inconsistency.
As mentioned, the hope behind this second approach is that one may be
able to list all ways in which inconsistencies can arise, and thereby derive a
positive definition of modal consistency indirectly.
(3) A third approach is to take the mentioned formal definitions of modal
consistency and extend them by relaxing certain assumptions. It is hard to
see what this should amount to in the case of BT, but there is a clear
motivation for wanting to relax BST’s history definition specified in terms
of directedness.
3.2 A first reason for relaxing BST’s history definition
The definition of a history as a maximal directed set in BST has the follow-
ing trivial consequence: if in a BST-structure 〈W,≤〉 there is only a single
history, then that history—which is equal to all of W—must itself be di-
rected. This is a limitation of BST: even in the (deterministic) case of just a
single history, that history is forced to be a directed set. It seems clear, how-
ever, that there are modally consistent scenarios that do not correspond to
a directed set of space-time points. We can think of two classes of examples
here. First, there are space-times that are not time-orientable, i.e., for which
we cannot define a global ordering.8 Such an ordering is however needed in
the definition of a directed set. Thus, for non-time-orientable space-times,
the BST approach to modal consistency is inappropriate. Second, even if we
limit attention to standard examples of time-orientable space-times, in de-
scribing a scenario we may restrict attention to a (small) region of space-time
rather than all of space-time. We will then want to be able to say that there
are, e.g., two different (modally incompatible) alternatives for the region in
question, each of which is itself modally consistent. Using directedness as
the criterion of consistency will not work in such a case unless the region
is itself directed,9 or consistency of an alternative for the region is treated
as a merely derivative concept. It seems therefore that the BST definition
of modal consistency enforces too strict a global constraint here, and that a
more local, relaxed definition of modal consistency should fare better.
One may even have the following worry: Given that we may want to
depict a scenario in a chosen geometrical region of space-time, may not
the BST definition of a history wrongly identify “additional” histories, i.e.,
8A simple example is a two-dimensional Möbius strip; see Malament (2012, §1.11 and
§2.2) for details. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
9Given the standard causal ordering of Minkowski space-time (see Definition 5), e.g.,
the unit circle or a rectangular region of space-time are not directed.
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mistake aspects of geometrical shape for modal branching? Here we have a
somewhat comforting (though rather limited) result precluding the creation
of spurious histories.
By Minkowski space-time we mean the following:
Definition 5 (ordered n-dimensional Minkowski space-time) For n ≥
2, the n-dimensional Minkowski space-time Mn is the n-dimensional Eu-
clidean space Rn (with its usual topology) together with the (causal) ordering
≤ defined by10
〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ≤ 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 iff
x1 ≤ y1 and (x2 − y2)2 + · · ·+ (xn − yn)2 ≤ (x1 − y1)2.
Elements 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 and 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 that are not order-related, are called
space-like related.
Here is the mentioned theorem. While it falls short of fully characterizing
all single history models of BST in Minkowski space-time, it illustrates a
general point that motivates a generalization of the BST definition of modal
consistency.
Theorem 1 Let the region R ⊆ M2 be an open set in two-dimensional
Minkowski space-time with ordering ≤. Let R be downward closed (i.e., if
x ∈ R and y ∈M2 s.t. y ≤ x, then y ∈ R) and such that each upper bounded
chain in R has a supremum in R and each lower bounded chain in R has an
infimum in R. Then 〈R,≤〉 is a BST model iff R is directed.
Proof: The “⇐” direction is trivial: if R is directed, it is the unique maximal
directed subset of R itself, so that R has just one history, trivializing the prior
choice principle (PCP). The other axioms of BST are fulfilled by assumption
(note that an open set in M2 cannot have a maximum).
In order to prove the “⇒” direction, we derive a contradiction from the
assumption that there are (at least) two different histories in R. That way
we have shown that R contains only a single (directed) history and thus,
must itself be directed.
10We are giving this simplified definition using coordinates so as not to presuppose any
differential geometry. For a clear exposition of the latter approach, which is standard in
physics, see Malament (2012, §2.2). Here, we are assuming coordinates in which the speed
of light c = 1; x1 is the time coordinate, x2, . . . , xn are spatial coordinates. The inequality
holds iff the spatial interval can be covered by a ray of light, or something moving at lesser
speed, during the temporal interval.
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So, assume that there are two histories h1, h2 ⊆ R with h1 6= h2, meaning
that there must be e ∈ h1 − h2. This e constitutes a (trivial) chain, so by
the PCP there must be some s ∈ h1 ∩ h2 s.t. s < e and s is maximal in
h1 ∩ h2. Now by density (which follows from the fact that R is an open set)
we can find f for which s < f < e, and working in coordinates and using
downward closedness of R we can indeed find such an f on the intersection
of the rim of the backward light cone of e and the rim of the forward light
cone of s. Clearly f ∈ h1, by downward closure of histories. Now let C
be a chain whose proper supremum is f (for f = 〈f1, f2〉, we can use C =
{〈f1 − 1/n, f2〉 | n ∈ N}); by downward closure we have C ⊆ h1. Now we
can show that C ⊆ h2 as well: Assume otherwise, then there has to be some
c ∈ C such that c ∈ h1−h2; the PCP gives us a choice point s′ < c maximal
in h1 ∩ h2, which must be different from s as C (and therefore c) lies below
f , and by construction of C, s 6≤ c. s and s′, both being maxima of h1 ∩ h2,
must be space-like related. By directedness of histories h1 and h2, there
have to be upper bounds ti ∈ hi with s, s′ ≤ ti, i = 1, 2. Now let x be the
unique intersection of the forward light cones of s and s′; we have x ≤ t1
and x ≤ t2, and thus, by downward closure of histories, x ∈ h1 ∩ h2. But
s < x, contradicting maximality of s in h1 ∩ h2.
We have shown that C ⊆ h2 as well. By assumption there is a supremum-
in-h2, f ′ ∈ h2. We can show that f = f ′, which proves our theorem, since
then we have s < f with f ∈ h1 ∩ h2, contradicting the maximality of s.
So, assume f 6= f ′, so that f ′ ∈ h2 − h1; the PCP gives us a choice point r
maximal in h1 ∩ h2 s.t. r < f ′. Now as f ′ is the supremum-in-h2 of C, there
is some c2 ∈ C for which r < c2. But c2 ∈ C ⊆ h1 ∩ h2, contradicting the
maximality of r. Thus, f = f ′, and our theorem is proved. 
This theorem may give us some comfort: its upshot is that if a region fulfills
a number of reasonable constraints including clauses (1)–(3) of Definition 4,
then the full set of BST axioms (and thus, the prior choice principle as the
most characteristic BST axiom, clause (4)) is fulfilled if and only if the region
is a directed set; the BST model then accordingly has only one history. Thus,
the BST definition of modal consistency does not create spurious histories,
in the following sense: there is no reasonable region (fulfilling the premises
of the theorem) that fulfils the BST axioms in such a way that the region
is split up into more than one history. This would be bad since we know
that the full 2-dimensional Minkowski space-time does not contain modally
incompatible events, and therefore no subregion can contain modally incom-
patible events either; so any region is modally consistent. BST accords with
this assessment, at least for the regions for which the theorem applies.
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The theorem however also reinforces the worry mentioned above: why
shouldn’t it be possible to have a modally consistent (single history) scenario
in a non-directed region of space-time (see note 9 above)? It seems that the
BST demand of global directedness rules out too many intuitively sensible
scenarios. Maybe the directedness requirement can be localized? This is in
fact so, leading to the project of defining modal consistency via so-called
continuations (Placek, 2010); see §4.1 below.
3.3 A semantical reason for generalizing modal consistency
So far we have motivated a generalization of BST’s definition of modal con-
sistency by recourse to the role of histories in the BST axioms: it seems
that that role leads to spurious geometrical constraints on BST models that
should be relaxed. Above we also pointed out that the notion of a history,
and thus the notion of modal consistency, plays another role in BT and BST:
it is used as a semantic parameter of truth. If we want to evaluate a sentence
about the future, we normally need to specify which of the equally possible
futures we mean to refer to, for otherwise no assessment may be possible.
But do we really need to specify a full history, a full course of events from
the beginning till the end of time? That seems a bit too much, really, and
it can’t be what is going on when we assess sentences containing the future
tense: we have to make do with much more limited information. And we
can. In fact, MacFarlane’s project of spelling out a notion of relative truth
via assessment sensitivity (MacFarlane, 2003, 2011) gives a useful model for
how we can often determine a truth value for sentences about the future
of their context of utterance, given in addition a second, later context of
assessment (see also Belnap (2002a) on “double time references”). In order
to develop a more general picture that also applies to BST, however, we have
to spell out modal consistency in terms of transitions—a notion that we need
to introduce before we can go on.
In a model of BT or of BST, we can sensibly ask where or when histories
branch. We will discuss the more general case of BST; given our assump-
tions about maxima in the intersection of any two histories in BT (which is
meant to mimic BST’s prior choice postulate), transfer from BST to BT is
immediate.
We need the following defined relations:
Definition 6 (Undividedness; splitting) We call two histories h1 and h2
undivided at e, h1 ≡e h2, iff (a) e ∈ h1 ∩ h2 and (b) there is some e′ > e
for which e′ ∈ h1 ∩ h2. Undividedness at some e means that two histories
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continue to overlap for at least a little while after e. On the other hand, if e
is maximal in h1 ∩ h2, so that e is a choice point for the two histories, we
say that h1 and h2 split at e, h1 ⊥e h2.
It turns out, given the axiomatic basis of BST, that undividedness at e is an
equivalence relation. This means that the set He of histories containing e is
partitioned into equivalence classes via ≡e. The elements of this partition we
can call the possibilities open at e—there are normally (far) fewer than there
are histories through e, as histories can split (much) later. The selection of
one of the possibilities open at some e corresponds to a basic transition.
Definition 7 (Basic transition) Let e ∈ W in a BST-structure 〈W,≤〉,
and let ≡e be the relation of undividedness-at-e among histories of W ; let
He be the set of histories in W containing e. The partition of He via ≡e,
the set of possibilities open at e, is denoted Πe. For H ∈ Πe, we call
the pair 〈e,H〉, also written e  H, a basic transition. If Πe = {H} =
{He} (i.e., the partition has just one element, corresponding to ≡e being the
universal relation on He), we call the transition e  H trivial, otherwise,
indeterministic. We call e the initial and H the outcome of the transition
e H.
The notion of a transition allows for a fresh look at modal consistency.
Instead of asking whether a total scenario is modally consistent or not (which,
as we have seen, is decided in BST via directedness), we can ask whether a
set of transitions is consistent or not. From a global point of view, this is
easy: given a BST-structure, a set of transitions is consistent iff there is a
history in which all of the transitions occur together; a maximally consistent
set of transitions then fully corresponds to a history (see Lemma 1 below).
Formally, for T = {ti = ei  Hi | i ∈ I}, with I an index set, we can define
the set of histories allowed by T , H(T ), to be
H(T ) := ∩i∈IHi.11
T is consistent iff H(T ) 6= ∅, i.e., iff T allows at least one history to occur.
In order to develop a more local approach to transitions, it is useful to
consider the transitions themselves as an ordered set, in accordance with the
following definition:
11In accord with standard conventions, we take the empty intersection to be maximal,
so that for T = ∅, we have H(T ) = the set of all histories in 〈W,≤〉.
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Definition 8 (Transition ordering) Given a BST-structure OW =
〈W,≤〉 with the set TR(OW ) of basic indeterministic transitions, and tran-
sitions t1 = e1  H1, t2 = e2  H2 ∈ TR(OW ), we say that t1 is be-
low t2 (t1 ≺ t2) iff (a) e1 < e2 and (b) H2 ⊆ H1. In the same vein, for
t1 = e1  H1 and e ∈ W , we say that t1 is below e (t1 ≺ e) iff e1 < e and
He ⊆ H1.
This defines a partial ordering ≺ among all the transitions TR(OW ) in a
BST-structure OW (the ordering properties carry over from < and ⊆). Note
that different transitions with the same initial, which are modally incompat-
ible, are incomparable according to ≺. Such a partial ordering can form a
natural interface for specifying a BST-structure with much less information
than the full BST partial ordering among events; this theme is developed in
detail in Müller (2010).
The following Lemma shows that histories are maximally consistent in
the transition sense of consistency, too.
Lemma 1 (Histories and maximally consistent sets of transitions)
Let OW = 〈W,≤〉 be a BST structure without funny business (see §4.2 be-
low) and TR(OW ) its set of indeterministic (non-trivial) basic transitions.
Let T ⊆ TR(OW ) be a set of transitions that is downward closed (i.e., if
t ∈ T and t′ ∈ TR(OW ) s.t. t′ ≺ t, then also t′ ∈ T ). Then T is maximally
consistent (i.e., T is consistent but no proper superset is) iff there is a history
h in OW s.t. H(T ) = {h}. Thus, a maximally consistent set of transitions
admits a singleton set containing just one specific history.
Proof: “⇒”: In case H(T ) = ∅, T is not consistent and thus, a fortiori,
not maximally so. So, let T be such that there are histories h1, h2 ∈ H(T ),
h1 6= h2. Then T is consistent. We have to show that it isn’t maximally
consistent. So let e ∈ h1 − h2, by the prior choice principle there is some
choice point s < emaximal in h1∩h2, and Πs has at least two members; letH
be the member of Πs containing h1, we know that h2 6∈ H. Let t = s H;
t is an indeterministic basic transition in TR(OW ), and t 6∈ T as t excludes
h2 ∈ H(T ). Then the set T ′ = T ∪ {t} is consistent (H(T ′) ⊇ {h1}), so T
isn’t maximally consistent.
“⇐”: If T is inconsistent, H(T ) = ∅. So let T be consistent but not
maximally so, i.e., there is some non-trivial t = e H ∈ TR(OW )− T s.t.
T ∪{t} is consistent. As T is downward closed, t must be maximal in T ∪{t}.
By consistency, H(T ) ∩H 6= ∅, whence H(T ) ∩He 6= ∅, as H ⊆ He. In fact
we have H ⊆ H(T ), as t is maximal in the transition ordering. We even
have that all of He ⊆ H(T ): we have He = ∪Πe, and any local alternative
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t′ = e H ′ with the same initial e as t and some H ′ ∈ Πe is also maximal
w.r.t. T , and thus, T ∪{t′} is consistent as well, securing H ′ ⊆ H(T ).12 But
as t is non-trivial, there are at least two non-empty members of the partition
Πe of He, i.e., there are at least two histories h1, h2 ∈ He, h1 6= h2. As
He ⊆ H(T ), the set H(T ) thus cannot be a singleton. 
While the definition of consistency for sets of transitions via histories is
straightforward, it would however also be useful to have a more properly local
characterization of consistency. One thing is clear: a consistent set must not
contain two different transitions with the same initial—that would be bla-
tantly inconsistent. Furthermore, any subset of a consistent set of transitions
is also consistent. Spelling out further local conditions of consistency and
inconsistency is an intricate issue, especially given the possibility of modal
correlations (so-called modal funny business, mentioned in note 12). We will
discuss these issues in §4.2 below.
Transitions are “where the action is”: at the initial of an indeterministic
transition, there are different possibilities for the immediate future.13 One
can characterize a scenario within a BST-structure fully by giving the transi-
tions that occur in it. Here is the promise of sets of transitions for semantics:
in evaluating a sentence as to its truth or falsity, it should normally not be
necessary to specify a maximal consistent set of transitions corresponding
to a history. Specifying some consistent set of transitions should be enough.
In this way we can hope to combine insights of both Belnap’s idea of “dou-
ble time references” and of MacFarlane’s theory of relative truth for future
contingents. Small sets of transitions can play the relevant role in semantics
because the carry enough information, and they have a good chance of being
epistemically and computationally tractable.14
12At this step the absence of modal funny business is required to secure the consistency
of T ∪ {t′}. In branching time, this condition is trivially fulfilled and therefore plays no
role; for the case of BST, see §4.2 below.
13In the stit-logic of agency (see note 6), an agent’s choice at a moment is also modeled
by an initial e together with a bundle of histories containing e—the only difference to
transitions is that a choice may be less fine-grained than a transition, i.e., bundle together
different members of Πe, or different transitions with initial e. It seems reasonable that
an agent’s control over what will happen may be less fine-grained than the immediate
possibilities themselves, and for independent agents in BT, coarse-grained choices are a
must (see Belnap et al., 2001, §7C.4).
14The latter point also seems important when it comes to linking the BST framework
with applications in computer science. For such applications, specifying a scenario in
terms of a global partial ordering is “too thick”—a smaller, discrete data structure is
needed. Such an idea is explored in Müller (2010).
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4 Alternatives to histories
The two types of considerations for rethinking modal consistency mentioned
above—relaxing the history definition of BST for more generality; focusing
on sets of transitions for a more local view—can be identified as driving
forces behind recent work by Placek (2010) and Müller (2010). We describe
Placek’s generalization of modal consistency in terms of “snake-links” in §4.1
before considering the “sets of transitions”-approach in §4.2. We will draw
some lessons for semantics, combining ideas from both approaches, in §4.3.
4.1 Continuations
In §3.2 we have seen that BST’s history definition enforces geometrical con-
straints on possible space-times that are not independently motivated. There
is a rather natural generalization of BST’s notion of modal consistency in
terms of directedness that properly generalizes the allowed range of space-
times. Placek (2010) has developed the idea of “continuations” as a back-
ground for spelling out possibilities without the notion of possible worlds or
histories. In that paper he also develops the generalized notion of modal
consistency that we will discuss.
Recall the motivation for viewing directedness as a criterion for modal
compatibility: if there is a perspective from which both events e1 and e2
have occurred, then e1 and e2 are modally compatible. One may ask why it
is necessary that there be a global perspective on e1 and e2. It seems that a
suitable multitude of local perspectives should also be enough to guarantee
local consistency: e.g., if there is no f above both e1 and e2, but there is
some f1 above e1 and some f2 below f1 such that there is some f3 above
f2 and e2, that should also do. See Figure 2 for the idea.15 Based on the
zig-zag nature of such links, Placek (2010) has called them “snake-links”.
Here is the official definition, including the important generalization of
“being snake-linked in a region”:
Definition 9 (Snake-link (in a region)) Let 〈W,≤〉 be a partial order.
Events e, f ∈ W are snake-linked (e ≈ f) iff there is some n ∈ N and
there are elements e0, . . . , en ∈ W such that (a) e0 = e, en = f and (b) for
i = 1, . . . , n, we have either ei−1 ≤ ei or ei ≤ ei−1.
15“Suitable” needs emphasis. What has been said so far, and what is in Figure 2, is
in fact not enough to guarantee modal compatibility of e1 and e2—any events in a BST
model can be linked via anM -shaped path (Belnap, 1992, Fact 14); if f2 is “too far below”,
e1 and e2 may be incompatible after all. See Definition 10 below for the precise meaning
of “suitable” (and, derivatively, of “too far below”), and Figure 3 for additional illustration.
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Figure 2: A snake-link between e1 and e2.
e and f are snake-linked in a region R ⊆ W (e ≈R f) iff there is a
snake-link e0 = e, . . . , en = f such that all of e0, . . . , en ∈ R.
In order to generalize the notion of modal consistency via snake-links, we
need two additional defined concepts. Following Placek, we will use
We := {x ∈W | e < x}
to denote the set of events above e. Being snake-linked in We is an equiva-
lence relation on We (reflexivity and symmetry are obvious from the defini-
tion; for transitivity, observe that snake-links in We can be easily concate-
nated). Thus we have a natural partition Pe of We. If Pe has more than
one member, we call e a choice event. Indeterministic transitions can now
be specified via such a choice event e and one member of the partition Pe.
We let CE(W ) be the set of choice events in W . Now we define the sets
WCe := {x ∈W | ∀c ∈ CE(W )(c < e→ c < x)},
which comprise all those events x that occur after any choice events in e’s
causal past. These sets play a crucial role in generalizing the notion of modal
consistency, so it is good to have a close look. Clearly, we have We ⊆ WCe ,
by transitivity of <. Figure 3 pictures the set WCe in a situation in which
there are three choice events c1, c2 and c3 in e’s causal past.
Based on the sets WCe , Placek’s definition of modal consistency (Placek,
2010, Def. 6) is the following:
Definition 10 (Modal consistency, snake-link style) Let 〈W,≤〉 be a
partial order. Elements e and f are modally compatible iff they are snake-
linked in the region WCe ∪WCf . A subset A ⊆ W is modally consistent iff
any two of its members are compatible.
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Figure 3: Illustrating the sets WCe . c1, c2 and c3 are the choice events in
e’s causal past indicated by the dashed lines (c4 and c5 are outside that
region). The region WCe is shaded grey; the boundary is not part of WCe .
Note that WCe contains all events above c5, even though events in different
continuations of c5 are incompatible.
In order to elucidate this definition, it is helpful to see that directed sets are
modally consistent according to the new definition: in fact, if there is f ∈W
such that e1 < f and e2 < f , then we have f ∈We1 ∩We2 ⊆WCe1 ∪WCe2 , and
e1, f, e2 is a snake-link. It is also easy to see that the new notion of modal
consistency properly generalizes the notion of directedness: e.g., in the one-
history case, now any convex subset of Mn (and in fact many other subsets)
counts as modally consistent. So we have reached our aim of generalizing
the notion of modal consistency, and the generalized notion has a claim to
both naturalness and to counting as local, as no global viewpoint for securing
consistency is needed any more.
On the basis of the new definition, BST can be generalized in a relatively
straightforward manner, replacing “history” by “maximally modally consis-
tent set” in the new sense. The axioms of BST referring to histories can
then either be retained, using the new sense of “history”, or “localized”, e.g.,
in the manner described by Placek (2010, Def. 8). We will have to leave the
question of the exact interrelation between the old and the new framework
for another occasion; see the mentioned paper for some pertinent remarks.
Placek (2010) also suggests that snake-link based continuations can play
a useful role in semantics, replacing the history parameter in Ockhamist
semantics by something more properly local, viz., by a pair e/A, where
A 6= ∅ and the set A ∪ {e} is modally consistent. We will here develop
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a complementary approach, in which the history parameter is replaced by a
set of transitions (§4.3). But first we need to work out more fully the notion
of modal consistency in terms of sets of transitions.
4.2 Small sets of transitions
We will be working with a BST-structure OW = 〈W,≤〉 in which the basic
indeterministic transitions ti = ei  Hi are identified; we will not consider
trivial transitions here. The set TR(OW ) is the set of all basic indeterminis-
tic transitions in OW , ordered by ≺ (see Definition 8). In §3.3 above we men-
tioned a “top down” approach to modal consistency in terms of transitions:
a set T of transitions is consistent iff all the transitions occur in one history,
so that the intersection of the outcomes of all transitions, H(T ) = ∩i∈IHi, is
non-empty—the transitions taken together allow at least one history to oc-
cur. When trying to develop a local perspective, this approach is not ideal,
as it still works with sets of (global) histories. The transition ordering is
helpful for the necessary local perspective.
A general idea for spelling out modal consistency of transitions in terms
of the transition partial ordering is the following: A set that contains two
transitions with the same initial is obviously (“blatantly”) inconsistent. In
the end, all inconsistency should be due to blatant inconsistency. (This
approach thus follows option (2) of §3.1). It is clear, however, that there can
be inconsistency without blatant inconsistency; a set of transitions does not
have to give the whole story, so to speak. To illustrate, consider OW such
that T = TR(OW ) = {t1, t2, t3, t4}, where ti = ei  Hi and e1 = e2, i.e., the
transitions t1 and t2 have the same initial. (So, T is blatantly inconsistent.)
Now suppose t1 ≺ t3 and t2 ≺ t4. The set T ′ = T − {t2} = {t1, t3, t4} is not
blatantly inconsistent: no two of the transitions in it have the same initial.
T ′ is however inconsistent: the initial e3 of t3 occurs in the outcome H1 of
e1, while the initial e4 of t4 occurs in the outcome H2 of e1 = e2, so that
e3 and e4 cannot occur together in one history, and accordingly, we have
H(T ′) = ∅. In order to unmask the inconsistency of T ′, we need to look at
the downward closure of T ′, defined as
DC(A) = {t ∈ TR(OW ) | ∃t′ ∈ A t  t′}.
We call a set of transitions A ⊆ TR(OW ) prima facie consistent iff DC(A)
is not blatantly inconsistent. It is easily seen that in our example of T ′, we
have DC(T ′) = T , and as remarked, T is blatantly inconsistent. So T ′ isn’t
even prima facie consistent.
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Why the cautious “prima facie”? In BT, the qualification is in fact un-
necessary. However, as spelled out in detail in Müller et al. (2008), the
spatial aspect of BST leads to complications here. Assume that A is prima
facie modally consistent and contains two non-order-related transitions t1
and t2 with different initials that are space-like related. Can we be sure that
A is really consistent—i.e., that H(A) 6= ∅? Even in the simplest case of
A = {t1, t2}, this may be problematic, due to what is called “modal funny
business” (Belnap, 2002b). It could be that local possibilities t1 and t2 do
not combine to form a global possibility (i.e, admit at least one history
together); something like this may be what is behind distant quantum corre-
lations (quantum non-locality). Whatever the empirical facts, it seems clear
that given the possibility of such non-local effects, a purely local approach to
consistency in terms of transitions is doomed; the non-local modal correla-
tions convey additional information that is not present in the local transition
ordering. Absent such funny business, however, prima facie consistency is
sufficient for consistency.16 In the following, final section, we will revert to
the framework of branching time, in which modal funny business cannot oc-
cur as there are no space-like-related moments (i.e., moments in one history
that are not order-related): by the definition of a history in BT as a maximal
linear chain, any two moments in one history have to be order-related.
4.3 Semantics in terms of sets of transitions
We will now show how departing from the use of histories in semantics leads
to a more local analysis of the future tense in branching time structures.17
The basic idea is to replace the semantic parameters of truth, which in
standard Ockhamist semantics are a moment m together with a history h,
by a moment m together with a set of transitions T . As in the standard case
that requires m/h s.t. m ∈ h, not any combination of m and T is allowed
as a parameter: m and T have to be compatible. In terms of the set of
histories allowed by T , H(T ), the demand that m and T form a useable set
of parameters of truth then is that T allows for m to occur: Hm ∩H(T ) 6= ∅
(note that this enforces consistency of T ). When we write “m/T ”, we thereby
indicate that that condition is met. We will presuppose a model based on
a BT-structure OW = 〈M,≤〉 with a set of basic transitions TR(OW ); a
model will have the form M = 〈M,≤, v〉. We will use the following defined
notions in what follows:
16See Müller et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion.
17In what follows, we will make some remarks pertaining to an extension of our frame-
work to BST. A full exposition will have to be given in a separate paper.
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• The set of transitions occurring before a moment m, TR(m), is
TR(m) := {m′ H ′ ∈ TR(OW ) | m′ < m & Hm ⊆ H ′}.
• Given a history h inOW , the set of transitions characterizing h, TR(h),
is
TR(h) := {m′ H ′ ∈ TR(OW ) | h ∈ H ′}.
According to Lemma 1, this guarantees H(TR(h)) = {h}.
Our idea for using sets of transitions in the semantics is the following: a set
of transitions T admits a certain set of historiesH(T ). We can simply extend
the Ockhamist semantics in terms of m/h by quantifying over all histories
from H(T ) where needed, without any changes to the model. Thus, the
base case and the propositional cases remain unchanged. (In line with what
was said above, we always assume that m/T is consistent in the sense that
Hm ∩H(T ) 6= ∅.)
• M,m/T |= p iff v(m, p) = 1.
• M,m/T |= ¬φ iff M,m/T 6|= φ.
• M,m/T |= φ & ψ iff M,m/T |= φ and M,m/T |= ψ.
The T parameter is used, but not altered, in the clauses for the temporal
operators:18
• M,m/T |= Pφ iff for all h ∈ Hm ∩ H(T ) there is some m′ ∈ h for
which m′ < m and M,m′/T |= φ;
• M,m/T |= Fφ iff for all h ∈ Hm ∩ H(T ) there is some m′ ∈ h for
which m < m′ and M,m′/T |= φ.
Note that the shifted index of evaluation used in both clauses, m′/T , again
fulfills the requirement that Hm′ ∩H(T ) 6= ∅, as m′ ∈ h for some h ∈ H(T ).
Note also that in the case of the past tense P , the parameter T plays no role;
given past linearity of BT structures, we could equivalently have written
• M,m/T |= Pφ iff there is some m′ < m for which M,m′/T |= φ.
18In the clauses for the so-called historical modalities of settledness and, dually, historical
possibility, T would have to be altered by the semantic clauses. We omit a discussion of
these operators here.
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It is only with respect to the future tense F that anything interesting hap-
pens. To see what, it is useful to look at two extreme cases. (a) If T = TR(h)
for some history h, we are back to the standard m/h semantics: there is only
one single history, viz., the h ∈ Hm∩H(T ), andm′ stays on h. So our seman-
tics is an extension of standard Ockhamism: we can get Ockhamism back if
we want. (b) If T is maximally unspecific given m, so that Hm ⊆ H(T ) and
accordingly, the clause for F quantifies over all histories in Hm, we get back
the Peircean truth conditions for F , demanding a witness in each history
through m. Note that this will always be the case if T = ∅, and that our
framework thus amounts to treating a Peircean index of evaluation, consist-
ing of a moment m only, as the moment/set-of-transitions pair m/∅, which
is another welcome sign of continuity with established semantic frameworks.
The Peircean behavior in case (b) is the price to be paid for the fact that
the given clause does not leave any cases undecided and does not have to
rely on supervaluations or similar.
The most interesting cases are cases in between, in which the given T
is neither too big to be accessible (recall that a history in a BT structure
stretches all the way into the future—we are never in a position to point out
a history uniquely), nor too small to tell us anything above the fact that m
is occurring. Are there such cases? A context of utterance does not specify
a history uniquely—that is, in a nutshell, the assertion problem confronting
Ockhamist semantics. Belnap (2002a) and MacFarlane (2003, 2011) both
argue that in many cases in which a sentence is uttered at some moment
of context mC , we assess the sentence at a later moment of assessment mA,
when the occurrence of the indeterministic event the sentence was about has
been settled. Thus, e.g., if before a coin toss, I say, “it will land heads”, and
in fact it lands heads, then from the perspective of that later moment, I can
assess my earlier utterance as having been true.19 Belnap and MacFarlane
propose different ways of making sense of that observation. Belnap uses a
speech-act analysis according to which later on, the earlier assertion is either
vindicated or impungned, which can have further normative consequences.
MacFarlane, on the other hand, proposes a postsemantics employing two
contexts, both a context of utterance and a context of assessment; relative to
a certain context of assessment, a sentences uttered earlier then can come out
as true or false. The current proposal easily handles MacFarlane’s approach,
but it is more general, and it is also open towards a speech-act reading à la
19If you’re tired of coin tossing, or if you think that Diaconis’s experiments about the
deterministic nature of a coin toss outcome given the initial conditions make this a bad
example of a future contingency, please fill in your favourite quantum mechanical example
instead.
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Belnap (we will however not comment on this in the following).
Let us fix a specific situation: at a moment mC (for “moment of context
of utterance”), Peter utters the sentence φ = “the coin will land heads”. At
the later moment mA (“moment of assessment”), he says, “what I said was
true”. The right diagnosis seems to be that while the sentence is contingent
relative to the context of utterance, and accordingly cannot be assigned a
truth value there unless additional information or structure is given, it is
no longer contingent relative to the context of assessment, so that assigning
a truth value seems appropriate. We can give the following definition of
relative contingency based on the m/T semantics:
Definition 11 (Relative contingency) A sentence φ is contingent w.r.t.
M,m/T iff there are histories h1, h2 ∈ H(T ) s.t. M,m/TR(h1) |= φ and
M,m/TR(h2) |= ¬φ.
It follows immediately that no sentence is contingent w.r.t. T for which
H(T ) = {h}—that is the fact on which standard Ockhamist semantics rests.
On the other hand, many sentences pertaining to the future are contingent
given T = TR(mC) with mC the moment of utterance. In our example
case, we have contingency relative to M,m/TR(mC), but not relative to
M,m/TR(mA), so that the sentence can indeed be assessed relative to the
context of assessment.
There are two advantages of our transition semantics over assessment
sensitive postsemantics for Ockhamism, as far as we can see: For one, the
semantics is uniform; no additional parameters are introduced to handle
assessment. Everything is dealt with in the uniform framework of m/T
semantics. Second, while we are here limiting discussion to branching time,
the m/T approach easily extends to BST. In fact in BST there is a second
case of relative contingency: there can be no knowledge about contingent
happenings space-like related to a context of utterance, so that there is
contingency in the causal elsewhere (the region of space-time outside the
past and future light-cone). In general, then, contingency can be resolved
by expanding a given parameter T to some T ′ ) T . The recipe to “wait
and see” that is behind Belnap’s and MacFarlane’s approaches is a highly
relevant special case of this, but not the only one imaginable, especially in
the context of a more general information dynamics.
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5 Conclusion
The guiding theme of the considerations in this paper is the following: use-
ful possibilities have to be identified below the level of maximally consistent
sets, or histories, in branching structures. This goes against the standard ap-
proach to modality in terms of “possible worlds”, which are likewise maximal.
Branching structures supply some useful resources for localizing possibilities
in terms of modal consistency. We have outlined two recent approaches for
capturing that notion: Placek’s “continuations” program and the “small sets
of transitions” approach. Combining ideas from both approaches, we have
spelled out a novel semantics for a temporal logic based on branching-time
in which the index of evaluation is not a moment/history pair, as in Ock-
hamism, but a pair consisting of a moment and a (compatible) set of tran-
sitions. That semantics extends both Ockhamism and assessment-sensitive
postsemantics, and it promises to make branching-time based temporal logic
more tractable.
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